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This work shows how two parties A and B can securely share sequences of random bits at optical
speeds. A and B possess true-random physical sources and exchange random bits by using a random
sequence received to cipher the following one to be sent. A starting shared secret key is used and
the method can be described as an unlimited one-time-pad extender. It is demonstrated that the
minimum probability of error in signal determination by the eavesdropper can be set arbitrarily
close to the pure guessing level. Being based on the M -ry encryption protocol this method also
allows for optical amplification without security degradation, offering practical advantages over the
BB84 protocol for key distribution.
INTRODUCTION
Physical cryptography can create schemes providing
two users, at distinct locations, with on-demand copies of
a secure sequence of random bits of arbitrary length and
at fast rates. These schemes could be of high value for
commercial systems operating over long distances. Based
on physical laws instead of mathematical complexities,
communication with perfect secrecy could be guaranteed
over an insecure channel in Vernam’s sense of a one-time-
pad. Technology advances, therefore, such as enhanced
computational power, should not affect the security of
these schemes. The BB84 quantum protocol for key dis-
tribution [1], the paradigm among protocols of this type,
has been used in short distance applications [2] but not
in long distance networks. One fundamental reason is
that the same no-cloning theorem that guarantees its se-
curity level prohibits the signal amplification necessary in
long-haul communication links. No practical alternative
quantum scheme using quantum repeaters or entangled
states has yet been proposed although theoretical stud-
ies exist [3]. Other practical impediments are the slow
speed of the photon sources and the large recovery time
of single photon detectors.
Recently, Yuen proposed [4] a ciphering scheme uti-
lizing an M -ry bases system that was implemented for
data encryption [5, 6]. Ref. [5] introduces the M -ry
scheme and presents its first prototype-level implemen-
tation. Ref. [6] gives a more complete description of
these systems. Basically, in these cryptographic proto-
types, known as αη (α standing for coherence and η for
efficiency) systems, the quantum noise inherent to co-
herent states forces different measurement results for the
eavesdropper and the legitimate users that use a shared
key in their measurements. This noise will increase the
observational uncertainty preponderantly for the eaves-
dropper, Eve (E), rather than Alice (A) and Bob (B), the
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legitimate users. Although this noise is irreducible by na-
ture to all observers, the knowledge of the key allows A
and B to discard this noise while it points to the correct
information. The very simple idea behind this is that,
for each bit, the noise inherent to the stated and gener-
ated at the emitter is distributed without control among
the output ports in Eve’s measurement apparatus while
A and B use the key to select a single output port where
the noise does not practically affect bit readings.
In this work a key distribution method is presented
that also utilizes an M -ry bases ciphering scheme similar
to the one described in [5] for the purpose of data en-
cryption. Each basis in the M -ry set of bases defines two
orthogonal states whereas these bases are non-orthogonal
among themselves [7]. In these schemes a starting shared
secret key is assumed between A and B. The phrase “key
distribution” is being used here to denote that one party
sends to the other random bits created by a truly ran-
dom physical process. The exchange of random bits be-
tween A and B is done in such a way that the quantum
noise of the light does not allow E to obtain the final
random sequence shared by A and B. In contrast, a clas-
sical key expansion method could mean a process to gen-
erate mathematically –e.g., by one-way functions– two
identical sets of random bits, one for each user, from a
set of shared starting bits. Stream-ciphers, for example,
generate a stream of pseudo-random bits from a start-
ing key. However, this deterministic process produces
correlations that can be detected by the eavesdropper.
Known-plaintext attacks are particularly useful to ex-
ploit these correlations in classical cryptography. In the
M -ry data encryption scheme, a stream cipher is used to
generate the running key and the quantum noise of light
protects against the correlations.
The key distribution method presented in this work
uses physical sources to guarantee the true randomness
of signals. As in the data encryption scheme, the quan-
tum noise of light provides the ultimate basic protection
against signal identification. After presenting a set of ba-
sic conditions to be obeyed by the system and the phys-
ical resources needed for A and B, the key distribution
2protocol will be described step-by-step. Each step will
be followed by a brief description of its possible imple-
mentation using the described physical resources. Very
briefly, these protocol steps describe how A and B suc-
ceed in sending new random sequences of bits from one
to the other securely through judicious use of the quan-
tum noise of light. This security is achieved by using a
correct combination of average number of photons per
bit and number of ciphering bases M , as will be shown.
The bit encoding mechanism and the associated physical
protection will then be discussed and a measure of the
minimum probability of error forced by the system on
the eavesdropper will be achieved. After showing that
the system obeys the established conditions, conclusions
will be presented.
BASIC CONDITIONS
First, a set of conditions will be defined to specify the
boundaries within which the problem has to be solved:
I) The eavesdropper is allowed to have full access to the
random signal sequence being generated. Granting full
access to the signal should be understood as similar to
an opaque attack or, giving Eve a perfect quantum copy
of the signal sequence. Anyway, Eve does not need to
subtly tap the channel to obtain the signals. Eve could
perform arbitrary measurements on this sequence or
she could generate as many realistic (imperfect) copies
as she wants. The unrestricted access to the signal
sequence is the best (idealized) possible condition given
to the eavesdropper.
II) Eve samples all signals near the source, such that
energy loss does not affect her data.
It will be initially assumed that all parties have similar
detectors; the simplest possible assumption would be of
noiseless detectors with efficiency 1. However, it will be
shown that although the eavesdropper needs high signal
resolution to distinguish between two closest bases in the
M -ry system and precision to identify a sent basis, the le-
gitimate users do not need such strict conditions. There-
fore, the detectors used by A and B can be less efficient.
It will be demonstrated how one can implement a secure
key distribution system where the minimum bit-by-bit
eavesdropping probability of error can be arbitrarily set
at the pure guessing value of 1/2.
As will be shown, the protection of this scheme does
not rely on an intrusion detection mechanism, but instead
on the measurement advantage enjoyed by A and B over
the eavesdropper, thanks to the knowledge of the key.
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FIG. 1: Basic scheme for key distribution. An emitter-to-
receiver part is shown. OM is an optical modulator. PhRG
is a physical random generator, PCI is a PC controlled inter-
face card. K0 is the starting running key. Y(R,K0) is the
ciphered R. A polarization beam splitter PBS followed by
two detectors constitute the detection system in the case of
polarized signals. In the case of phase modulation, a phase
sensitive detection system should be used.
THE KEY DISTRIBUTION PROTOCOL
Basic physical resources
The basic resources necessary for implementation of
this key distribution protocol are sketched in Fig. 1.
Two stations, A and B, are represented where the op-
tical channel can be either free space or a fiber channel.
Both sides have identical resources to operate as emitter
or receiver [8]. The OM’s are optical modulator systems
performing polarization or phase modulation on meso-
scopic coherent pulses of light. Each party also possesses
a fast speed physical random generator (PhRG) that pro-
duces binary outputs R. PCI is a PC controlled interface
card that can generate M voltage levels. PBS is a po-
larizing beam splitter that is followed by two detectors
designated by 0 and 1. This detection system can be used
for polarized light signals. In the case of phase modula-
tion the detection system should be modified accordingly.
The protocol
Each of the seven protocol steps will be stated briefly
(in italics) and for a more complete illustration of the
scheme, a short description of one possible way to imple-
ment each step will follow:
1. Parties A and B share an initial secret random se-
quence (of length L0) of bits K0.
How A and B will share this initial sequence is, of course,
an important matter. Although current cryptography
can provide enough security for sharing the short se-
quence K0 at this moment, it may be vulnerable to the
evolution of computational power. Just as an example,
K0 could be obtained in a secure way within a few years
through the slow but proved secure BB84 key distribu-
tion system. The use of satellites to distribute quantum
3keys have been under study (See Ref. [9] and references
therein) and developments in this direction can be ex-
pected to produce fruits in a near future. Unless proved
otherwise, the expected rates of this quantum key distri-
bution will be low. The scheme studied in this paper aims
to create a fast distribution rate once a short sequence
K0 have been obtained - even through a slow process.
2. Party A generates a sequence (of length L0) of true
random bits R.
This sequence of bits R can be obtained from the bi-
nary output of the physical random generator (PhRG)
as voltages VR = V+ or V− that are going to be associ-
ated with bits 0 and 1. A possible visualization of such a
process could be the voltage outputs Vi (i = 1, 2, · · ·)
within a short time window ∆t, around ti, produced
by a fast light detector, shot-noise limited, illuminated
by a coherent light beam. The sign of these pulses,
signi = (Vi−Vi)/(|Vi−Vi|), where Vi is the average pulse
voltage, will feed a binary voltage source to provide the
random bit sequence R [10].
3. A sends to B the random sequence R (≡ R1) of
length L0 in blocks of size KM . Ciphering each of these
blocks uses KM bits from K0. The number of blocks to
be ciphered in L0 is L0/KM . A coherent state carrier is
used with intensity 〈n〉/bit.
In order to generate each cipher basis k(= 0, 1, · · ·M−1),
KM (= log2M) bits are used from the random sequence
of bits K0 (e.g, k = b(KM )2
M−1 + b(KM−1)2
M−2 +
· · · b(K1)20). In other words, each k basis of the M =
2KM set will be randomly defined by KM bits taken from
K0. Each k will be used to cipher a block sequence of size
KM from R1. Ciphering R1 in blocks of size KM keeps
the length of the transmitted bits constant and equal to
L0 (See [11]).
From the experimental point of view, the signals pro-
vided by the PhRG and by the running key (K0) define
voltage levels to be applied by the PCI to the optical
modulator OM. Each voltage Vk generated is associated
with a specific basis of the M -ry scheme. The pulsed
mesoscopic coherent state at the input (see Fig. 1) can
be seen as a linearly polarized state of light. Orthogonal
polarizations define bits 0 or 1. The input pulse is modi-
fied by the action of the OM into a state (e.g., elliptically
polarized light) Y(R,K0) that is sent to B. Without the
modulation given by Vk the output signal would show the
sequence R of orthogonally linearly polarized states (bits
0 and 1) on a single basis. The Vk modulation converts
these signals to a non-orthogonal set of M -ry states. A
similar line of reasoning applies to phase modulated sig-
nals, where phases 0 and pi provide the two bits.
4. By knowing the sequence of bits K0, Bob demodu-
lates the received sequence obtaining R1.
At the receiving station, by applying the shared key K0
Bob demodulates the changes introduced by A and reads
the resulting true random stream R1 of orthogonally po-
larized light states. A and B now share a fresh sequence
of random bits R1.
5. Bob obtains a fresh random sequence R2 from his
PhRG and sends it to A, ciphering the sequence in blocks
of size KM . Ciphering bits are taken from the earlier
sequence received R1.
Each sequence of bits, of length KM , from R1 define the
ciphering basis for KM fresh bits in R2. By knowing R1,
A reads R2 with perfection. The first cycle is complete.
6. A and B continue to exchange random sequences as
described in the first cycle.
Subsequent cycles can be performed and in each cycle,
blocks of size KM are ciphered to keep the total length
in each cycle constant and equal to L0. A and B can
then share sequences of random bits obtained from the
PhRGs. A shared random sequence can be used to re-
start a cycle by A or B whenever an interruption occurs.
7. A and B apply information reconciliation and pri-
vacy amplification to distill a final sequence of bits.
The process of privacy amplification discards bits in the
sequence and, consequently, destroys the short-ranged
bit-cipher correlations due to the block ciphering. As
the PhRGs present no bit correlation, the final shared
random sequence will present a similar statistical prop-
erty.
These steps describe the protocol without discussing
security aspects. However, being a physical protocol,
it would be incomplete without specifying 〈n〉 and M .
These parameters have to be provided, under the initial
conditions presented, and a quantitative measure of the
security level associated with them has to be derived.
This is the subject of the following sections.
BIT ENCODING AND THE PHYSICAL
PROTECTING MECHANISM
The physical protecting mechanism in this case is the
same as that on which the αη systems are based. Al-
though it has already been described, with examples, in
Ref. [5], it will be presented here and discussed to clarify
the security provided by the quantum noise of light to this
key distribution system. A bit-by-bit proof [6], based on a
Positive Operator Valued Measured theory (POVM), will
follow. The choice of a POVM demonstration relies on
its generality once the wave function or the density ma-
trix that represents the physical process is chosen. The
resulting analysis carries the information content in the
density matrix and has broad validity. This is particu-
larly useful because the eavesdropper should be allowed
to use any technology or attack (beam-splitter, cloning,
homodyne measurements and so on) and a general pro-
tection cannot be based on particular threat models.
The security analysis to be presented covers both po-
larization and phase modulation of optical signals. In
the case of free-space implementation, the coherent states
defining each bit are two orthogonal modes of polariza-
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FIG. 2: Ciphering wheels for phase angles φk. Cases M = 1
to M = 5 are shown for a given bit. Each k value specifies
a two-state basis (0, 1) where component states are separated
by ∆φ = pi.
tion. In the phase ciphering, two modes separated by a
phase of pi could be used. In the polarization case the
running key specifies a polarization basis from a set of
M uniformly spaced two-mode bases spanning a great
circle on the Poincare´ sphere. Fig. 2 sketches the M -
ry ciphering protocol as implemented in the αη systems
[5, 6] where closest bits are mostly distinct from each
other. In this key distribution scheme, the same M -ry
scheme is utilized. Each basis represents a polarization
state and its antipodal state at an angle pi from it (bits
0 and 1). The mapping of the stream of bits onto points
of the Poincare´ sphere is the key to be shared by A and
B. It points precisely to the basis being used at each bit
emission. Each k-basis is defined by the Poincare´ an-
gles Θk and Φk. The number of bases M chosen should
be such that the uncertainties caused by the quantum
noise of light on the polarization angles leads to a large
error. This can be understood in a variety of ways; for
example, by directly writing the manifold of two-state
{|Ψ(Θk,Φk)〉} bases in Cartesian (x, y) coordinates fixed
at the OM physical axes (chosen at 450 from the hori-
zontal) gives
|Ψ(Θk,Φk)〉 = |αγ(Θk,Φk)〉x ⊗ |αδ(Θk,Φk)〉y , (1)
where α is the coherent amplitude and γ and δ are the
projections on x and y.
γ =
[
(1 − i)eiΦk/2 cos(Θk/2) + (1 + i)e−iΦk/2 sin(Θk/2)
]
,
δ =
[
(1 + i)eiΦk/2 cos(Θk/2) + (1− i)e−iΦk/2 sin(Θk/2)
]
.
For example, on a great circle set by Θk = Θp = Θ0, the
overlap 〈Ψ(Θk,Φk)|Ψ(Θp,Φp)〉 between states k (Φk =
pi
M k) and p (Φp =
pi
M p) gives
|〈Ψ(Φk)|Ψ(Φp)〉|2 = e−2〈n〉
[
1−cos
(
Φp−Φk
2
)]
. (2)
This will define the polarization angle uncertainty pro-
duced by the shot noise associated with the coherent
states. For large 〈n〉 the periodic functions in Eq. (2)
can be expanded around Φp, as Φk ≃ Φp + ∆Φ, giving
|〈Ψ(Θk,Φk)|Ψ(Θp,Φp)〉|2 ≃ exp
[−∆Φ2/(2σ2)]. σ2 =
1/〈n〉 is the uncertainty associated with the Poincare´’
angle. This uncertainty is directly associated with light’s
shot noise and cannot be overcome regardless of one’s
precision capabilities. Without knowing the precise ba-
sis sent (or angle), E cannot obtain the bit that is sent.
Her measurement of the polarization angle becomes un-
certain by the uncorrelated noise [5, 6] in the two axes
( 〈n1n2〉 = 〈n1〉〈n2〉 ). It will be shown that this noise
can be used judiciously to prevent an eavesdropper from
accessing the information while the legitimate receiver
B can control it. This access is given by the knowledge
of the key: the legitimate receiver projects the received
signal completely onto one of the physical axes of the re-
ceiving system (e.g. the PBS in Fig. 1) and this way
the associated noise becomes irrelevant to his binary de-
termination (See Refs. [5, 6] for experimental results).
Receiver B can even support moderate misalignments of
his bases system because whenever most of the light falls
into one of his detectors this would indicate the correct
bit. In contrast, for Eve, apart from the uncertainty
caused by the noise, even a small misalignment will give
her an incorrect basis. Furthermore, her measurement
system needs high resolution and precision to obtain re-
liable data for analysis. The number of bases Nσ within
σ is Nσ = Mσ/pi = M/(pi
√
〈n〉). The system should
be designed, as it will be shown, such that Nσ covers a
reasonable number of adjacent bases.
Phase modulation of the signals can be utilized by cre-
ating two pulses delayed by a fixed amount of time and
introducing a phase difference φb between them to rep-
resent bits 0 or 1 (e.g., φb = 0 and pi). An extra phase
difference φk is provided by the KM shared bits. At the
receiver, these pulses can be made to interfere and by
subtracting the phase φk, B can recover each random
bit sent. Formally, this phase encoding could be writ-
ten starting from a coherent state |α〉 that is split into
a two-mode coherent state |Ψ0〉 = |α/
√
2〉1 ⊗ |α/
√
2〉2.
Bit encoding using the two-mode state, represented by
annihilation operators a1 and a2, can be done by
|Ψb〉 = e−iJzϕb |Ψ0〉 = |e−iϕb/2 α√
2
〉1 ⊗ |eiϕb/2 α√
2
〉2, (3)
where Jz =
(
a†1a1 − a†2a2
)
/2. This phase modulation
can also be interpreted as a relative one, with the zero
reference taken at one of the states . A crucial ingredi-
ent in the security demonstration is that the modulation
operations have to be unitary or energy conserving. In
this way, the input energy associated to each pulse will
have to be distributed between the two modes. Precise
information about the energy content in each mode is
not needed, but one is assured that all energy is being
accounted for in the demonstration. Although losses are
unavoidable in real systems, this condition also reflects
the fact that technical losses are expected to decrease
with advances in technology and so they can be consid-
ered asymptotically negligible. Therefore, for a modu-
lation system that is not energy conserving in principle,
the following demonstration does not apply.
5In the phase modulation case, one can associate an in-
dex ν, in general, to the ciphering angle φν to represent
a possible applied modulation. This index ν could repre-
sent a discrete or a continuous variable determined by a
general distribution. In this M -ry scheme ν = k.
A ciphered bit in the two-mode state will be written
|Ψbν〉 = e−iJz(ϕb+φν)|Ψ0〉
= |e−i(ϕb+φν)/2α/
√
2〉1 ⊗ |ei(ϕb+φν)/2α/
√
2〉2 , (4)
where ϕb (= 0, pi) specifies the bit being “sent” and φν
is the ciphering phase. The overlap of |Ψbν〉 and |Ψbµ〉
leads to an equation similar to (2).
EAVESDROPPER’S MINIMUM PROBABILITY
OF ERROR
To show that this key distribution scheme is secure two
basic points have to be demonstrated:
1) For a fresh bit sent, the minimum probability of error
PEe that an eavesdropper can achieve in the bit determi-
nation must be guaranteed to be arbitrarily close to 1/2,
2) The use of a given random sequence 2×KM , one time
as a “message” and the second time as a cipher for the
fresh random sequence, still allows one to set PEe → 1/2.
As a starting point for the first part of the demonstra-
tion, the density matrix ρ for all possible two-mode states
resulting from ciphering a bit b is written as
ρb =
1
L
∫ L
0
Pφν |Ψbν〉〈Ψbν |dν , (5)
where L is the space spanned by ν and Pφν describes
a general phase distribution. The optimal POVM for
discriminating between ρ0 and ρ1 (or ∆ρ = ρ1 − ρ0), in
the polarization case, was first applied in Ref [6].
Calling Π1 and Π0 (Π1 + Π0 =I) the projectors over
eigenstates with the positive and negative eigenvalues of
∆ρ, the probability of error PEe is
PEe = Tr[p1Π0ρ1 + p0Π1ρ0] , (6)
where p1 and p0 are a-priori probabilities to find a state
in ρ1 or ρ0, respectively. P
E
e defines the minimum prob-
ability of error that is caused by a wrong choice of bases
by Eve when she tries to determine a bit sent. Of course,
error levels higher than the one given by Eq. (6) can be
found but the interest here is to find Eve’s lower bound
of error in a bit-by-bit determination.
P (φν=k) randomly establishes the index k associated
with discrete phase values φk in the ciphering wheel
shown in Fig 2 where adjacent bits to a given k are mostly
distinct bits from the kth bit. For this implementation
the location of the two-state bases are given by
φk = pi
[
k
M
+
1− (−1)k
2
]
, k = 0, 1, ...,M − 1 . (7)
For equal a-priori probabilities p1 = p0 = 1/2, Eq. (6)
reduces to
PEe =
1
2
Tr[Π0ρ1 +Π1ρ0] =
1
2
(1− Tr[Π1∆ρ])
=
1
2
(1− 2
∑
j
λj) , (8)
where λj are the positive eigenvalues to be obtained from
∆ρ =
1
M
M−1∑
ν=k=0
e−iJzφν (|Ψ1〉〈Ψ1| − |Ψ0〉〈Ψ0|) eiJzφν . (9)
Eq. (9) can be expanded as
∆ρ =
∞∑
q=−∞
∞∑
q′=−∞
∆ρq,q′ |Φq〉〉〈〈Φq′ | , (10)
where
∆ρq,q′ = −2ie−|α|
2
√
I2|q| (|α|2) I2|q′| (|α|2)×
sin [(q′ − q)pi/2] ei(q′−q)pi/2 1
M
M−1∑
k=0
eiφk(q
′−q) , (11)
where Ij is a Modified Bessel function,
|Φq〉〉= 1√
I2|q|(|α|2)
∞∑
J=|q|
(
α/
√
2
)2J
√
(J − q)! (J + q)! |J, q〉〉 (12)
and |J, q〉〉 = |J − q〉 ⊗ |J + q〉 . (13)
From the positive eigenvalues of Eq. (11), the minimum
probability of error, Eq. (8), can be calculated.
Eq. (9) can be expanded in several ways, the adopted
expansion uses the angular momentum basis |J, q〉〉 =
|J − q〉 ⊗ |J + q〉, that is a natural basis to deal with
angular rotations.
Assuming that k values have uniform probability of oc-
currence one can show that the number of a-priori prob-
abilities for the number of occurrence of even-k or odd-k
lines, given M , is
peven−k(M) =
1− (−1)M + 2M
4M
,
podd−k(M) =
−1 + (−1)M + 2M
4M
. (14)
For simplicity and without loss of generality, let us adopt
bases even in M , where peven−k(M) = podd−k(M) =
1/2 = p1 = p2, to show numerical examples. Figure 3
shows the minimum probability of error as a function of
the number of ciphering levels M . PEe goes very fast
to the asymptotic pure-guessing limit of 1/2 as M in-
creases. It is then shown that the minimum probability
of error PEe → 1/2, at a fixed average number of photons
|α|2, can be achieved by increasing the number of bases
620 40 60 80 100
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FIG. 3: PEe as a function of M for |α|
2 ≡ 〈n〉 = 1, 10, 100,
and 1000.
M adequately. This demonstrates that in this scheme
an eavesdropper cannot obtain the individual bits sent,
regardless the precision of her devices. The physical ori-
gin causing this impossibility for Eve to obtain an angle
φk and therefore the associated bit, rests in the source
emission itself. Although a deterministic angle can be
applied to the modulator the resulting light output is
probabilistic in nature and in single shot measurements
with mesoscopic states the resulting field does not carry
this applied angle φk but presents a distinct φ
′
k. This is a
Nature’s fact that cannot be changed regardless the mea-
surement applied (homodyne, heterodyne, and so on).
This completes the first part of the demonstration.
For the second part of the demonstration, one has to
show how repetitions of the cipher to encode the distinct
bits generated in the random process increase the res-
olution achievable by the eavesdropper over the signal
sent. One should recall that cipher repetition are used
in the block ciphering described in step 3 of the proto-
col. As discussed in [11], these repetitions are not neces-
sary because the ciphering procedure can be randomized
bit-by-bit through use of a stream cipher using the KM
sequences as seed keys.
One could ignore this perfectly possible randomiza-
tion an calculate a much more drastic case, one where
both cipher and bit were repeated r-times. This can
be seen as an overestimated upper bound for the ac-
tual situation because each random bit sent is a fresh
bit in the sequence being sent. As photon numbers
in distinct coherent pulses of same amplitude fluctu-
ates in an uncorrelated way, in r-repetitions of a sig-
nal the resolution achieved for extraction of this sig-
nal increases with the number of repetitions. This is
quantitatively obtained from the r-product of Eq. (2):
P (r; k|p) ≡ P (k|p)⊗r ≃ exp [−r∆Φ2/(2σ2)]. This Gaus-
sian process gives the standard deviation σ′ = σ/
√
r as-
sociated with the angle uncertainty in a measurement
process. This uncertainty σ′ is equivalent to the one ob-
tained from a single shot measurement with the photon
number r〈n〉. In other words, a single shot using r-times
the laser power will give the same signal resolution for a
bit reading as the r-repeated sequence with 〈n〉. Conse-
quently, for a fixed M , the r−repetition of the random
sequence then reduces PEe from P
E
e (〈n〉) to PEe (r〈n〉).
The dependence of PEe can be calculated as a function of
〈n〉 and M for arbitrary numbers. Therefore, the system
can be designed to a desired security level PEe , through
the correct choice of 〈n〉 andM . As a numerical example
consider, say, M = 32 (or KM = 5 bits) with 〈n〉 = 100
to achieve PEe = 0.476 in a single shot (see Fig. 3). To
guarantee the same security level (PEe = 0.476), due to
the r = 2×KM = 10 repetitions, one should use M = 90
(KM ∼ 7) corresponding to 〈n〉 = 10× 100 = 1000. The
conclusion is general regardless of the specific numerical
example. Proper scaling can be done for other intensity
levels adequate for the sensitivity of the detection sys-
tem. Although this is an overestimated calculation it is
adequate for our purposes to show that the protection
level can be increased according it is needed. The alter-
nate encryption described in [11] reduces this overhead
substantially because each level used to cipher each bit
is close to have occurred in a truly random.
It has been shown that the transmission stages A→B
and B→A can be made secure under individual bit at-
tacks. The quantity PEe can be connected to the bit-
error-rate probability and entropy measurements such as
mutual information or relative entropy, can be directly
derived from it.
The following section discusses some aspects of attacks
on this scheme. As there are no ciphertext or known-
plaintext involved in the transmission of random bits,
attacks on the transmitted random sequences to obtain
the key K0 have to start considering a guessing proba-
bility of 1/2 for each bit or 1/2L0 for any complete se-
quence sent. Considering that for each new bit sent the
random noise may produces ∼ Nσ possible outcomes in
a measurement process, the number of possibilities to
be considered grows exponentially depending on L0 and
Nσ!. This indicates that an unsurmountable computa-
tional problem would occur for a large number of bits
sent.
EVE’S RECORD, CORRELATIONS AND
DRAWBACKS
Next, one has to show that the security level calculated
also holds under the basic conditions already defined: I)
The eavesdropper is allowed to have full access to the
random signal sequence being generated. II) She would
work near the source to avoid signal losses.
7Bit-cipher block correlations
In general, any degree of correlation in a bit sequence
can be explored by Eve to decrease her degree of un-
certainty. While use of true random numbers eliminate
intrinsic correlations in the generation process the KM
block cipher utilized introduces a short range bit-cipher
correlation. The increased number of levels M utilized
was aimed to increase Eve’s bit-by-bit probability of er-
ror to the guessing levels even under the block cipher-
ing used. Although Eve cannot obtain the random bits
sent from the measured signals one may argue that some
correlation may be detected due to the bit-cipher corre-
lation. As one can see from the given numerical exam-
ples, the condition Nσ > KM can be easily applied to
the communication scheme with mesoscopic states. This
condition assures that the uncertainty produced by the
noise overcomes the amount of knowledge associated to
these correlations. In a linear algebraic system it corre-
sponds to a number of unknowns larger than the number
of available equations. Nevertheless, information recon-
ciliation and privacy amplification [12] distill a random
sequence about which Eve has a negligible amount of in-
formation and also has the additional effect of destroying
the short bit-cipher correlations. Basically, the fact that
the information known by the legitimate parties differs
from that obtained by the eavesdropper is what allows A
and B to achieve the secrecy goal.
Homodyne and delay line
Homodyne and heterodyne techniques can be also uti-
lized by Eve to obtain the signals with better precision
than a direct detection measurement. With knowledge of
the key sequence Bob and Alice always utilize the proper
quantum measurement basis for their optimal binary de-
tection, assuring a resolution superior to the one obtained
by Eve. In principle, if the seed key is available to Eve,
after her records were created, she could apply rotations
over the recorded signals to obtain the correct sequence.
This has to be performed in a sequential operation due to
the lack of structure in the PhRGs generation of random
numbers. This differs from performing a mathematical
operation with a deterministic function to obtain a result
xn−1 given xn, up to x0. Nevertheless, assuming that
this inversion is possible in principle, Eve could obtain
the random sequence once the starting key is available
[13]. This will be equivalent to a futuristic optical delay
line that could be tapped on demand and Eve could wait
as long as necessary until the shared starting key is made
available to her and only then perform her measurements
perfectly mimicking Bob’s measurement over her copy of
the signals. With the key, E does not need the same reso-
lution as before and the applied rotations would lead her
close enough to the correct axis orientation and to bit
identification. Therefore, the shared starting key has to
be protected at all times. This is the fundamental draw-
back of this system [14], although it is not important in
the current state of technology . In essence, assuming a
protected starting key, this method can be described as
a one-time-pad extender.
The futuristic delay line discussed led to the protec-
tion of the starting key at all-times because there are no
in-principle impediments for creation of such a device.
One could also invoke a perfect photon number cloning
so that Eve could obtain multiple perfect copies of each
signal sent. Perfect copies would allow Eve to obtain
the correct bit sequence but perfect cloning violates the
no-cloning theorem. Realistic amplification schemes with
linear optical amplifiers introduce spontaneous noise that
decreases Eve’s signal resolution. Imperfect cloning [15]
using realistic number distribution consisting of mixtures
of stimulated and spontaneous thermal processes are akin
to linear optical amplification and degrades signal reso-
lution.
Phase measurement bounds
Even without reference to a particular setup, it is
worth comparing the obtained numerical results with the
bounds on phase measurements imposed by the smallest
detectable phase shifts usually considered (See [16] and
references therein). They are: 1) the standard quantum
limit (SQL), given by ∆φSQL ∼ 1/
√
N , 2) Squeezed light
limit (Sqz), given by ∆φSqz ∼ 1/N3/4, and 3) “Heisen-
berg” limit ∆φH ∼ 1/N . A homodyne setup to identify
a given phase that uses, say, a squeezed field has to scan
the phase interval of interest to probe for the best reso-
lution region where the phase measurements lapse below
shot noise condition. In the case of interest in this pa-
per, each signal pulse will be set randomly in one basis
chosen among M bases. The minimum interval between
bases is ∆φmin = pi/M . A uniform scan on the semicir-
cle (pi) with maximum efficiency will find the particular
basis sent within a fraction ∆φmin/pi = 1/M of the pulse
containing N photons. One could therefore impose the
condition for indistinguishability of the sent phase using
the lowest limit given by ∆φH :
∆φH > ∆φmin . (15)
Writing ∆φH to take into account the optimized fraction
of the pulse, one has
∆φH =
1
(1/M)N
, (16)
and therefore
M >
√
piN . (17)
This condition is satisfied under the conditions exempli-
fied in Fig. 3, in agreement with obtained results.
8Speed costs and other aspects
The main cost for the security obtained in this scheme
is the M -ry number of levels needed. An increased num-
ber of levels demands an increased number of bits to pro-
vide the necessary resolution and a wider dynamic range
for the waveform generators to provide such modulations
at high speeds. For example, in case one assumes the
overestimated 2KM repetition this will decrease the bit
output rate from, say, 10GHz, to 10GHz/2KM . For a
nonrepeated cipher, if one uses M = 1000 (KM ∼ 10),
and 〈n〉 = 104 the number of levels covered Nσ =
M/(pi
√
〈n〉) ∼ 3.18. To keep the same number of lev-
els Nσ covered under the 2 ×KM repetition, equivalent
to a single shot with the intensity 2 × KM higher, the
number of levels necessary isMnew ∼ 4472. This reduces
the speed to 10GHz/2KMnew = 0.4GHz from 10GHz. Al-
though this large increase in the number of levels is not
necessary [11] it emphasizes the overhead involved when
one increases the number of levels M .
Exploratory physical attacks by the eavesdropper, such
as injection of a strong signal to detect the weak reflec-
tions from the surface of the OM modulator, and from
these to obtain the modulation applied, can be easily de-
tected by signal splitting. Specific analysis for the physi-
cal attacks could be applied on a case-by-case basis. The
robustness of the signals under signal jamming by an en-
emy, for example, may be of interest for some applica-
tions. In this case, one could superpose on the ciphering
levels phase and amplitude modulations and even utilize
emission at distinct wavelengths to provide a set of con-
ditions that the legitimate parties could use to extract
the signals. Again, specific issues require case-by-case
responses. These questions are not related to the secu-
rity aspects of interest here. In the same way, computer
attacks [19] and general attacks outside the optical chan-
nel are not the focus this work.
Signal amplification
The presented key distribution scheme aims to defeat
Eve’s actions at the source, where no losses occurred.
Amplification processes always degrade signal resolution
for Eve or Bob. As Eve is already defeated at the source,
she cannot obtain any improvement through amplifica-
tion. On the contrary, the knowledge of the key allows
Bob to distinguish signals as long as he has a good signal-
to-noise ratio. Therefore, amplification is possible for the
legitimate receivers because they need a smaller resolu-
tion degree than Eve. It works as long as A and B can
identify signals in orthogonal bases. A and B apply sim-
ple binary decisions to distinguish between orthogonal
bases while Eve, on the other hand, needs high resolu-
tion to distinguish between adjacent levels of the M -ry
scheme. This is why an increased noise for A and B due
to the amplification process does not have the same ef-
fect on Eve’s measurement. With the signal protected at
the source, noise created by amplifiers can be acceptable
for A and B until their error bit rate exceeds a toleration
level.
Numerical simulations indicate that A and B can uti-
lize amplifiers up to distances of ∼ 500km before signal
regeneration becomes necessary. These simulations con-
sider the spontaneous decay in amplifiers onto the mode
to be amplified as well as onto the mode orthogonal to
the carrier. These added noise sources degrade signal
resolution for the users and increase the bit error rate.
Other error sources exist such as acoustic and thermal
fluctuations but they occur in a much slower time scale.
It is important to observe that any advantage ob-
tained by A and B over E, at the source, leads to an
increased communication distance for A and B. Although
B can support losses as long as this system presents
a low bit error rate, his superiority over Eve decreases
and ceases at the moment where Eve can have an equal
or larger amount of information than Bob [17]. These
differences can be estimated by calculating PEe (0)/P
B
e ,
where PEe (0) is Eve’s error probability at the source and
PBe is calculated after the amplification stages. Ideally,
PEe (0)/P
B
e ≫ 1. Therefore, any randomization that can
be further introduced by Alice at the source amplify-
ing Eve’s uncertainty will reflect as an increased range
for secure communication [17]. Randomization can be
increased by several means; however, increasing the ran-
domization level usually has a cost associated to the pro-
cess that has to be weighted with respect to the gain to
be achieved.
Summarizing, signal amplification is essential for In-
ternet and this key distribution scheme can be tailored
for some of these applications.
MUTUAL INFORMATION
The concept of mutual information I(X : Y (X)), con-
cerning the amount of information on X giving the ob-
servable Y, allows one to extract basic information on this
key distribution system. The minimum probability of er-
ror for Eve, bit-by-bit, derived in Eq. (6), PEe , gives the
bit-error-rate for Eve in the binary entropy H(R|Ye(R)).
The mutual information IE(R : Ye(R)) = H(R) −
H(R|Ye(R)) = 1 + PEe log2 PEe + (1 − PEe ) log2(1 − PEe )
describes the amount of information Eve could obtain in
a bit-by-bit attack on R. Fig. 4 shows this dependence as
a function of M and some values of 〈n〉. H(R) = 1/per
bit (or L0 for a perfect random stream of length L0).
Although an individual bit-by-bit attack is only a lim-
ited attack from Eve it shows the increasingly difficulty
the attacker finds as a function of the variables used.
The presented key distribution process intends to per-
form a distribution between two users of a fresh sequence
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of random numbers generated by one or more PhRG’s.
While the final shared sequence is truly random, as it was
thoroughly discussed, each sequence was obtained using
the former sequence to cipher it. The whole process was
then dependent on the secrecy of the fist key sequence
K0 (of length L0). As long as one chain in the sequence
is not compromised, the whole sequence results secure.
In other words, although A and B may share an arbi-
trarily long sequence of random numbers, the security of
the process relies in a single element of the chain. This
is distinct from processes described as fresh key genera-
tion in the conventional nomenclature where one aims to
create keys that are unconditionally secure even after the
starting key is compromised. This goal has not yet been
achieved outside from single photon protocols and it is a
constant matter of study [17].
This intuitive dependence of the security of the chained
sequence of keys on a single element of the chain can
be formalized as follows. Using the definition of mutual
information utilized above,
I(R : Y (R)) = H(R)−H(R|Y (R)) , (18)
and writing the difference between the mutual informa-
tions between B and E at each cycle of length L0 :
∆I = IB − IE
= [H(R)−H(R|YB(R))]− [H(R)−H(R|YE(R))]
= H(R|YE(R))−H(R|YB(R)) . (19)
From the fact that, at best, H(R|YB(R)) = 0 and
H(R|YE(R)) = L0 in the first cycle, one sees that
∆I ≤ L0, what shows that the uncertainty may be kept
at the first sequence L0 with a level given by L0 itself.
The conditions that Bob reads without errors the ran-
dom numbers sent (H(R|YB(R)) = 0) in a sequence of
length L0 and that the secrecy of the shared key for
Eve is perfect (H(R|YE(R)) = L0) are basic and rea-
sonable assumptions. To complete the derivation, one
may write the chaining rule [18] H(L1, L2, · · · , Ln|YE) =∑n
i=1H(Li|Y, L1, · · · , Li−1) to see that
H(L1, L2, · · · , Ln, · · · |YE) =
H(L1|YE) +H(L2|YE , L1) +H(L3|YE , L1, L2) + · · ·(20)
One can see from this rule that in the first round where
L1 (or {R1, · · ·RKM}) is ciphered with K0, unknown to
Eve, Eve’s entropy knowing YE is H(L1|YE) = K0, as
long as no information on K0 is leaked to her. However,
in case Eve knows L1 and YE she could know L2, that
is to say H(L2|YE , L1) = 0 because this provides her
with the same information that Bob has, and so on with
the subsequent terms. Therefore ∆I = K0 or, in other
words, Eve’s uncertainty is K0 (length L0). In case Eve
is unable to obtain L1, L2 · · · this result does not apply,
of course, and Eve’s knowledge on the whole sequence
of transmitted random numbers is null. This analysis
stands for any length L0, that has to be tailored accord-
ing one needs. For L0 = 10
9, as an example, implies
that to break the sequence Eve has to order correctly 109
bits, what gives her a probability for success of 1/(210
9
).
Privacy amplification steps further decreases PEe as well
as destroys short range correlations in original random
streams. Even periodic replacements of the starting keys
can be introduced and the whole process can be tailored
to any advances in computational capabilities.
Quantum noise
One should understand that the inherent quantum
noise in the system sometimes invalidates conventional
techniques one could use in a noiseless system. For ex-
ample, in the case of a classical M -ry ciphering, or ci-
phering with intense coherent signals, Alice could send
repeatedly a given bit r to Bob fixed in any basis of
the M -ry detection system. Bob measures successively
r1 = r, r2 = r, r3 = r, · · ·. The following properties then
holds: 1) Any pair of r obeys r ⊕ r = 0. Therefore, 2) If
a message bit x is ciphered as y = x ⊕ r by Alice, Bob
is able to recover x using any obtained r by performing
y ⊕ r = x. This holds because r is obtained noiseless
and, therefore, r ⊕ r = 0 . Classical one-time pad ap-
plications are “noiseless”. Quite distinctly, when using
a mesoscopic coherent state, a repeatedly sent bit r will
be read by a receiver that does not know the basis to be
used, as r1 = r +∆1, r2 = r +∆2, ..., where ∆j express
the effect of the noise in the channel. In this case, 1) Any
pair of r obeys ri ⊕ rj = ∆1 + ∆2 instead of r ⊕ r = 0
; 2) If a message bit x is ciphered as y = (x ⊕ r)i by
Alice and Bob has rj , he obtains y ⊕ rj = x + ∆i + ∆j
instead of x. This only stresses that the knowledge of the
bases used to transmit the random sequences or keys is a
crucial step for this key distribution system. One should
realize that the channel noise, inherent to the light field,
has its source at the emitter itself, ignoring all technical
noises eventually present.
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CONCLUSIONS
It has been demonstrated that a fast key distribution
scheme between two stations can be implemented where
the practical physical limitations are set by the speed of
the electro-optic modulators and acquisition electronics
available through current technology. A secure random
sequence obtained can be utilized in “Vernam’s one-time-
pad” sense, for applications that demand unconditional
security. Fundamentally, the system allows for signal am-
plification, as in the αη systems. The system works as
long as the receiver has a good signal-to-noise ratio after
the last amplification stage and the occurred losses do
not give him an information level worst than Eve’s. The
possibility of amplification paves the way for long dis-
tance key-distribution protocols protected by the quan-
tum noise of light, offering a practical advantage over
single-photon protocols.
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